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I. INTRODUCTION
Several global problems of extremes have raised fundamental questions
about the viability of American capitalism and about the legal regime 
enabling it to exist and thrive—the American property system. One
problem concerns the troubling and growing concentration of wealth in 
the hands of a few.  This problem of extreme wealth exists not only in the
United States but also at the global level, both within and between
developed and developing countries.  In the United States, for example, 
the 400 richest Americans saw their wealth triple or quadruple in size 
since the 1980s yet represent only .00025% of the country’s population.1 
* © 2021 Lynda L. Butler.  All rights reserved.  Chancellor Professor of Law and
Director, Property Rights Project, William & Mary Law School.  B.S. William & Mary; 
J.D. University of Virginia.  I would like to thank the Law School for its summer research grant
support.  Much appreciation also to Alli Mentch for her superb research assistance and 
Felicia Burton for her dedicated word processing support. 
1. See Gabriel Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality, 11 ANN. REV. ECON. 109, 119
fig.1, 123 fig.3 (2019).  Zucman defines wealth as all financial and non-financial assets 
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The 150 million adults in the bottom 60%, in contrast, experienced a
decrease in wealth from 1987 (5.7%) to 2014 (2.1%) and collectively 
owned less than the 400 richest Americans.2  A number of studies of 
different data sources have confirmed this trend of a sharp increase in the 
wealth share of the top 1% of Americans.3 Though wealth distribution in 
other countries is more varied, many nations also have experienced significant 
concentrations of wealth.4  In Russia, for instance, the transition from 
communism to capitalism resulted in an extremely high wealth concentration.5 
One important consequence of this problem of extreme wealth is the 
consolidation of political influence in the hands of a few, who can more 
6 easily fund their candidates and causes.
A second related problem of extremes concerns the widening gap
between high-income and low-income classes, aggravated by an increase 
in the low-income classes.7  As lower income people lose their ability to 
earn and to accumulate wealth, they become more vulnerable to economic 
downturns and less able to climb up the income ladder or out of poverty.8 
This decline is due in part to the 2008 financial crisis, which devalued the 
main form of wealth of middle- and low-income people—their home.9 
The bigger the gap becomes, the more the sense of injustice and outrage
grows, producing calls for change.  In the United States, those calls have 
“over which households can enforce ownership rights and that provide economic benefits to
their owners, net of any debts.”  Id. at 112.  Gabriel Zucman has been described as “America’s
top wealth detective.”  Ben Steverman, The Wealth Detective Who Finds the Hidden 
Money of the Super Rich, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 23, 2019, 2:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-23/the-wealth-detective-who-finds-
the-hidden-money-of-the-super-rich [https://perma.cc/3RP8-8KYW].  For an introduction to
the disagreement among economists on the extent of the inequality problem, see Economists Are 
Rethinking the Numbers on Inequality, ECONOMIST (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.economist. 
com/briefing/2019/11/28/economists-are-rethinking-the-numbers-on-inequality [https://
perma.cc/K3NR-MAPE].
2. Christopher Ingraham, Wealth Concentration Returning to ‘Levels Last Seen
During the Roaring Twenties,’ According to New Research, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2019, 
9:12 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/02/08/wealth-concentration-
returning-levels-last-seen-during-roaring-twenties-according-new-research/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.844162deb303 [https://perma.cc/2H53-UU3M]; USA, WORLD INEQUALITY 
DATABASE, https://wid.world/country/usa/ [https://perma.cc/8CRA-6XKY].
3. See Zucman, supra note 1, at 110–11. 
4. See id. at 111. 
5. Id. 
6. Ingraham, supra note 2. 
7. See id.
 8. See id.
 9. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CHRONICLES ON OUR TROUBLED TIMES 1–2 (Seth 
Ackerman trans., 2016); see also David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 
610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 22–24, 29–32 (2007) (asserting that 
neoliberalism is restoring power and dominance to the wealthy class that lost power to 
social democracy movements). 
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included such wealth redistribution devices as an increase in the minimum 
wage,10 Medicare for All,11 a more progressive tax code, and a millionaire’s 
tax.12 Unless changes occur, the gap could continue to widen to a point 
that would threaten social and political cohesion. 
In addition to these problems of extreme wealth and extreme poverty, 
the United States and the world are facing potentially catastrophic
environmental harm resulting from climate change.13 An overwhelming
percentage of the world’s climate scientists agree that greenhouse gas 
emissions must be reduced significantly—and soon—in order to avoid 
reaching a tipping point, where the Earth’s climate system moves to a new 
state that will be much less hospitable to life as we know it.14  Warming
10. See Heather Boushey, Understanding How Raising the Federal Minimum Wage
Affects Income Inequality and Economic Growth, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 
(Mar. 12, 2014), https://equitablegrowth.org/understanding-the-minimum-wage-and-
income-inequality-and-economic-growth/ [https://perma.cc/FD6S-HGRH].
11. Health Care as a Human Right – Medicare for All, BERNIE SANDERS,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/medicare-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/NT73-4NA9]; Jeff
Stein, Sen. Kamala Harris’s 2020 Policy Agenda: $3 Trillion Tax Plan, Tax Credits for 
Renters, Bail Reform, Medicare for All, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019, 8:40 AM), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/21/sen-kamala-harriss-policy-agenda-trillion-
tax-plan-tax-credits-renters-bail-reform-medicare-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/Q369-UUWZ].
12. See Liz Goodwin, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Wealth Tax and Lays Down 
2020 Marker, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 24, 2019, 8:57 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/
politics/2019/01/24/elizabeth-warren-will-propose-wealth-tax-very-rich/9PYJIr0xLrdSjv 
XX7h0szM/story.html [https://perma.cc/KKA6-JDCA]; Stein, supra note 11; Robert Reich, 
Why We Need a Wealth Tax, ROBERT REICH (May 14, 2019), https://robertreich.org/post/ 
184864571375 [https://perma.cc/M88W-TNT6].
13. See Stephen Leahy, Climate Study Warns of Vanishing Safety Window–Here’s 
Why, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/ 
%202019/03/%20climate-change-model-warns-of-difficult-future/ [https://perma.cc/ 
DN7S-S8VM].
14. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 4 (2015), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_
FINAL_full_wcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y666-CVZW]; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RSCH. 
PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT 14, 35 (2017), https://science2017.global 
change.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP6U-U39B] [hereinafter
CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT]; Leahy, supra note 13.  The National Climate Assessment 
released in November 2018 concludes that the dangers posed by climate change are
worsening.  U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, 2 FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 34–71 (2018), 
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/1/ [https://perma.cc/8ADK-ZUBD]; see also Brady 
Dennis & Chris Mooney, Major Trump Administration Climate Report Says Damage Is 









    






   
     
      
  
      
  
oceans and temperatures lead to more water in the atmosphere, the melting 
of land and sea ice, rising sea levels, and more intense weather events in 
whatever form they occur.15  Category 5 hurricanes will develop more 
quickly and frequently, snowstorms will cover larger areas and produce 
greater accumulations, polar air will plunge more deeply, and arid conditions 
caused by shifting ocean and atmospheric currents will lead to longer 
droughts and more intense wildfires.16 
All three problems of extreme are occurring largely unchecked because of 
the excesses of the American form of capitalism and the now dominant 
economic theory of property that allows capitalism to operate virtually
unconstrained.17 The current American strand of capitalism is a free
market, neoliberal approach that stresses the importance of marketplace 
transactions and the decision-making of rational, self-interested actors 
who are often free-riding on others.18  The economic theory of property
underlying American and other western-style property systems legitimates 
the power of owners to decide, largely on their own, how to use and 
manage their property.19  That theory encourages the disaggregation of 
resources into increasingly smaller units for the purpose of creating 
greater returns, though not necessarily in the form of actual goods and 
products.20 Indeed, much of the new wealth is held as finance capital 
H7K8]. In December 2019, two experts warned that, because of deforestation and fires, 
the Amazon is now facing a tipping point.  See Chris Mooney & Brady Dennis, Top




15. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 14, at 5–7; 
CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 231. 
16. See CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 231, 277; JOSEPH
ROMM, CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 73–74, 80–84, 118–23 
(2016). See generally UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WHEN RISING SEAS HIT HOME: 
HARD CHOICES AHEAD FOR HUNDREDS OF US COASTAL COMMUNITIES (2017). 
17. See STEVEN PEARLSTEIN, CAN AMERICAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE? WHY GREED IS
NOT GOOD, OPPORTUNITY IS NOT EQUAL, AND FAIRNESS WON’T MAKE US POOR 33–39 
(2018) (discussing how self-interest, rational expectations, and a zealous commitment 
to efficient markets hijacked Adam Smith’s economic theory). 
18. See Robert Kuttner, Neoliberalism: Political Success, Economic Failure, AM. 
PROSPECT (June 25, 2019), https://prospect.org/economy/neoliberalism-political-success-
economic-failure/ [https://perma.cc/CC65-DH6P].
19. For a financial expert’s explanation of the relationship between private property and
capitalism, see Sean Ross, How Are Capitalism and Private Property Related?, INVESTOPEDIA 
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and, to a lesser extent, as social capital.21  Each smaller property unit, in
turn, includes the gatekeeping or decision-making power accompanying 
individual ownership. Because of the focus on the individual decision-
maker and the economic incentives guiding decision-making, the American 
systems of property and capitalism have acquired a distinctly predatory 
character that, if left unchecked over time, could undermine political and 
social cohesion and destroy the integrity of the Earth’s biophysical systems.22 
With its focus on individual rights and its exclusion-based perspective,
the American property system is not now set up to encourage an outward-
regarding or system-wide view of life.  Alternative property arrangements, 
like naturally occurring commons and hybrid arrangements having both
private and public property characteristics, tend to be ignored or viewed 
with suspicion. Though statutes and regulations could constrain the exercise of
an owner’s decision-making power, significant limitations would be 
necessary to address the problems of extremes.  These limitations could, in 
turn, face challenges, both legal and political,23 including constitutional
claims under the takings clauses of federal and state constitutions.  Even 
if the challenges ultimately fail, they would slow implementation of 
solutions addressing the underlying problems.  Further, the underlying 
norms of common law property still would not change. 
Can—or should—the American property system adapt to curb the excesses 
inherent in the dominant form of capitalism?  Those extolling the virtues 
of privatization of resources would likely answer in the negative.  Such a
response would ignore the core functions and infrastructure of the
21. Restrictive covenants facilitate capitalization of social capital by, for example,
promoting and protecting shared interests in certain living arrangements.  See JOSEPH 
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 222–23, 253 (5th ed. 2017) [hereinafter SINGER, PROPERTY].  
Finance capital is created, for instance, by mortgage investment practices.  See Joseph 
William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage 
Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 507–12 (2013) (discussing 
banking practices in the subprime mortgage market that created finance capital for the 
originating lender and serious risk of nonpayment for many others).  A new type of 
securitization of real estate involves rental payments from single-family homes and 
exemplifies the trend toward overreliance on financial asset property.  See Faisal Chaudhry, 
Property as Rent, ST. JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3374554 [https://perma.cc/2XQA-T4NM].
22. See Harvey, supra note 9, at 22–23, 33–39. 
23. For an example of a legal challenge delaying regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions and the political challenges raised by the intense lobbying efforts of fossil fuel 
companies to prevent greenhouse gas emission regulation, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007). 
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American institution of property.  This Article discusses the structure of 
property that enables property law to evolve over time, reacting to changing 
conditions, recognizing informal customs and usages, and otherwise taking 
into account important feedbacks.  It explains how property provides an
ordering system of concepts and principles that define and govern relations
between a society and its resources at an individual and collective level.
As an ordering system, property performs the important functions of
allocating, distributing, and managing interests in the society’s resources
according to accepted norms and principles. The in rem nature of property 
rights gives holders their power over third parties, while constitutional
provisions protect property owners from government overreach.24  Basic
operating principles and norms then guide the decision-making of the 
property owners—the gatekeepers—in ways that again reflect accepted 
norms. But when those norms and principles ignore physical realities, 
when they clash with other values fundamental to the political structure of 
the society, when they conflict with modern scientific truths and 
understandings, it is time for the property system to reevaluate some of its 
core operating principles and guiding norms.  Such a reform effort, however, 
requires a deeper understanding of the importance of viewing property as 
a system. 
II. PROPERTY AS AN ORDERING SYSTEM
A search for property’s hidden structure requires understanding how
property is an ordering system.  Private property orders daily life in ways that
promote economic activities while protecting individual liberty and 
autonomy.  Property promotes economic activity through its delegation of
power and its incentive structure.25  By a simple delegation of decision-
making authority, property law gives the owner of a resource the power 
to decide how and when to hold, use, transfer, and care for the resource.  
The owner’s individual preferences are shaped by property’s internal 
incentives, which are tied to a particular society’s political and social 
values.  Under the American system, the scale of decision-making traditionally 
has focused on the owner’s personal interests and the boundaries of the 
particular property,26 even though the impacts of the use may have a
24. For a private property advocate’s perspective on the relationship between private
property rights and the Constitution, see Roger Pilon, Property Rights and the Constitution, in 
CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 173, 173–90 (8th ed. 2017), https://www.cato.org/ 
sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-handbook-for-
policymakers-8th-edition-16_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS4J-BNSM].
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much greater footprint.27  The information costs of property owners are
controlled by core operating principles that limit the flow of information.  
The numerus clausus principle, for example, restricts the types and 
categories of property interests allowed, thus controlling the options and 
information that prospective property owners must consider.28  Easement
law also controls information that property owners should weigh in 
deciding whether to grant an easement in their land by tying the use right 
to the physical boundaries of the original benefitted estate and banning 
expansion of that land beyond those boundaries.29 Without this ban,
prospective owners of the burdened land would not be able to foresee how 
large the benefitted land could become. 
In a democratic society, the liberty and autonomy interests of property 
owners are protected not only from other members of society but also
from government itself.30  The Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution prevents the government from taking property for public use 
without payment of just compensation, while the Due Process Clause 
protects property interests from government deprivation without due process of 
law.31 The in rem character of property rights acts as property’s powerbase, 
giving possessors rights that are good against the world except for a party 
with a superior claim.32  The peaceful possessor typically does not need an
armed force to protect her rights, only strong and independent courts dispersed 
among the states and applying the states’ respective property laws. 
The in rem nature of property reflects a fundamental distinction between 
property and contract rights.  Contracts produce interests that are generally 
only valid between those at the bargaining table as well as subsequent 
parties voluntarily brought into privity of contract.33  Property rights, in
27. If the property is intangible, the boundaries would primarily be legal or 
technological. 
28. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (discussing the 
numerus clausus principle).  Estates in land, for instance, only include a limited number 
of types and forms.  See id. at 12–14. 
29. See, e.g., Penn Bowling Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64, 66
(D.C. Cir. 1949). 
30. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
31. Id. 
32. See McAvoy v. Medina, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548, 549 (1866); Armory v.
Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664; 1 Strange 505, 505; J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN LAW 23, 26–27, 68, 70–71, 75–76 (1997) (discussing the in rem nature of 
property rights). 
33. See PENNER, supra note 32, at 23.
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contrast, can bind third parties not at the bargaining table and not a successor-
in-interest simply because of the in rem character of the rights.34 Third 
parties normally cannot go onto the land of another without the permission of 
the owner—even though the third parties never agreed to the acquisition of 
rights by the landowner—because of the owner’s rights, which include the 
power to exclude.35  Assuming the relevant statute of limitations has not
run, a subsequent possessor of personal property cannot prevail against a 
prior possessor who did not voluntarily relinquish his rights, not even 
when the prior possessor’s rights are based on finding the property.36  As
against the subsequent possessor, the prior possession is peaceful and 
superior.37  Through the in rem character then, a default ordering system 
of priorities is established for resolving conflicts.38 
Even covenants between the original parties to a transaction can acquire an 
in rem character if the covenants meet certain requirements designed to 
identify those covenants so closely connected to the use and possession
of the property that they are considered to be part of the ownership
interests.39 In addition to a properly created and qualifying property 
relationship, today typically done through a conveyance, common law 
property requires that the original parties intend for the covenants to run 
with the land and be part of the ownership interests in the land.40  The 
covenant also must touch and concern the land, directly affecting use of 
the property or directly enhancing or restricting the value of the property.41 
These requirements act as sieves to ensure that the wheat is separated from 
the chaff, allowing those covenants intended to affect and control the use
of the land to pass through to bind or benefit remote parties subsequently
34. Id.
 35. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997)
(protecting the essential right to exclude against an intentional trespass with an award of 
punitive damages even though no real damage occurred); see also Adams v. Cleveland-
Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 218–19, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing and
deciding to maintain the important differences between trespass actions protecting the 
right to exclude and nuisance actions protecting the right of use, reasoning that an owner 
should not have to justify exercising the right to exclude). 
36. Clark v. Maloney, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 68, 69 (Del. Super. Ct. 1840); Anderson v. 
Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636, 637 (Minn. 1892).  But if the statute of limitations to recover 
possession has run, the subsequent possessor may have acquired a superior interest through 
adverse possession.  See generally Songbyrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 23 F. Supp. 2d 
219, 222–23 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 
37. Clark, 3 Del. (3. Harr.) at 70. 
38. For further examples of how the in rem character shapes operating rules and
manages property rights, see infra notes 41–45, 108–21, and accompanying text. 
39. See Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of
Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 172–73 (1971). 
40. See id. at 178. 
41. See SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 253–55. 
80
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acquiring interests in the tract or in related property—for instance, when 
subdivided lots are developed under a common plan.  So, for example, a 
covenant to refund a security deposit included in the prime lease would 
run with the land and bind successor landlords if the security deposit could 
only be used to repair the leasehold premises or cover payment of unpaid
rent. But if the security deposit instead was used as a bargaining chip to
induce a party to agree to the lease, the covenant would not have enough
of a tie to the property relationship in the leasehold to warrant being treated
as a covenant running with the land and would instead be an interest that
lies in contract.42  Covenants that meet the tests and pass through property’s
sieves for running with the land help to decrease the costs of property 
transactions by eliminating the need for future negotiations.43 
Informal arrangements also may lead to recognition of a limited type of
in rem interest and to formalization of internal norms.  For example, when
one party induces another to rely and make substantial investments in
property, thinking that the relationship would result in a more permanent use
right, courts have found ways to effectuate the contemplated arrangement.44 
If the first party then tries to deny any permanence to the use, the party
who relied might be able to enforce the arrangement in equity as creating a 
sort of property interest. In some cases, the interest might even become
transferable, binding a successor-in-interest.45 Such results promote desired
behavioral goals, encouraging cooperation between neighbors or transacting 
parties. 
Property’s powerbase, internal incentive structure, and information-cost 
controls enable it to self-organize and self-regulate.  Henry Smith developed 
an information cost theory of property that explains property’s structure.46 
42. See Mullendore Theatres, Inc. v. Growth Realty Invs. Co., 691 P.2d 970, 972 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
43. Though covenants also could create legal boundaries for intangible property, 
like software, that bind third parties, courts so far have preferred to use contract principles in 
those situations.  See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
44. See Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE
L.J. 111, 135 (1991). 
45. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Ky. 1976). See generally
JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 32.07 (3d. ed. 2012) (discussing 
irrevocable licenses or easements by estoppel). 
46. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 
1693, 1716, 1725 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Property as the Law of Things]. Through the 
Fourth Restatement of Property project, Smith proposes to capture the architecture of 
property, and thus the complexity of the system, by revealing the concepts, principles, and 
organization of the system as well as the interactions of the parts and the coherence of the 
 81




   
  
   
 
   
 





     
    
  
 
   
   
     
   
      
 
 
Modules established by core concepts organize property’s complex system
by regulating the flow of information to promote efficient transactions and 
decision-making.47  Information not relevant to a particular situation is 
walled off by the modular structure through property rules and features.48 
These modules are based on preset packages of rights that have developed 
over time and regulate interactions by limiting portals of entry between 
the external world and the property system.49  The modular structure thus
streamlines interactions, limiting choices an interested party may consider.50 
Restricting the forms that property interests may take, in turn, promotes
standardization.51 Property’s networks of communication—the marketplace 
and the courts—then help property to self-organize and self-regulate in a 
social system sense.52  Those networks pass on information shaped by 
internal norms and rules through the modules to interested parties.53  The
marketplace serves as the main network for communicating economic 
information, while the courts provide the primary means of communicating 
legal rules and standards.54 Property thus is the central system in a
democracy for integrating power over resources into daily life through its 
structure, norms, and behavioral rules.55 
The internal norms and options embedded in property’s decision-making 
pathways allow the system to operate with minimal government intervention 
by making assumptions about default rules and strategic choices.56  Property,
whole. See Henry E. Smith, Restating the Architecture of Property, in 10 MODERN STUDIES
IN PROPERTY LAW 19, 21–26 (Ben McFarlane & Sinead Agnew eds., 2019) [hereinafter Smith,
Restating the Architecture of Property].
47. Smith, Restating the Architecture of Property, supra note 46, at 21–26. 
48. See Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 46, at 1701–02, 1708; 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 26–38. 
 49. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 46, at 1706–10, 1716–18, 
1725–26 (describing the “LEGO-like interface” of property forms).  For a discussion of 
the dialectical processes involved in the evolution of property interests and principles, see 
Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 899–908 (2013) 
[hereinafter Butler, Resilience of Property].
50. See Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 46, at 1707–08, 1711–12,
1720–21, 1725–26. 
51.  Id. at 1707–08, 1710–13. 
52. Lynda L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 
1215, 1242 (2017) [hereinafter Butler, Property as Management].
53. See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 49, at 886–90; Butler, Property
as Management, supra note 52, at 1242. 
54. See FRITJOF CAPRA & PIER LUIGI LUISI, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF LIFE: A
UNIFYING VISION 308–14 (2014) (discussing the networks of communication, origins of 
power, and types of structures in social systems). 
55. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 52, at 1242. 
56. See Lee Anne Fennell, Options for Owners and Outlaws, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER 
PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 239, 241–48 (2012); David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property 
Rights as a Recipe for Economic Development, ACCT., ECON. & L., Jan. 2011, at 1, 4 
82
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for example, assumes that a tenant, as possessor of the leasehold premises,
bears the risks of gains and losses associated with the exercise of possessory 
rights.57  More generally, property assumes that people are rational actors and
prefer more rather than less wealth, and that private rights are generally 
superior to public or common rights.58  These preferences are shaped and 
reinforced by the American legal system’s strong tradition of individual 
rights and the dominant economic theory now justifying private property 
rights.59  Over time, however, the embedded options and norms lose their 
connection to the original defining context and acquire a significance of 
their own, framing choices and obscuring the underlying meaning.60  As
the connection to context is lost, the norms and options speak for themselves, 
driving behavioral patterns even when physical realities and knowledge 
have changed.61  The constitutional protections accorded property rights then 
build in a rigidity and inertia that make necessary change very difficult to 
achieve.62  Though it is possible to alter the pathways of embedded options
once feedbacks are detected, the problem of rigidity, created in part by 
constitutional protection of economic expectations, raises serious obstacles.63 
(2011).  For an examination of how scripts or embedded options guide decision-making
and can increase transaction costs, see Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting 
the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 863, 884–89, 896–908 (2010).  See generally IAN
AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. McEnany, 48 N.E. 781, 781 (Mass. 1897); Paradine v. Jane 
(1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 898; Aleyn, 27, 28. 
58. See Kennedy, supra note 56, at 2–9 (introducing the argument that strong property 
rights are linked to economic growth).  For an explanation of the assumptions and conditions 
underlying Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand and how the power of a strong 
legal regime dislodges capital from those assumptions and conditions, see KATHARINA 
PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 1–15 
(2019).
59. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 537 (1989) (discussing the federalists’ efforts to protect individual rights through the 
Contracts and Taking Clauses); Butler, Property as Management, supra note 52, at 1223– 
50 (discussing property’s management role). 
60. Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 49, at 886; see Kennedy, supra note 
56, at 5; Macey, supra note 56, at 905. 
61. Macey, supra note 56, at 903–06. 
62. Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 49, at 888. 
63. Id. at 889. 
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III. PROPERTY’S FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS
Property’s self-organizing and self-regulating features enable the system 
to serve three important functions: allocating rights and interests in a
society’s resources; distributing those rights and interests consistent with 
the society’s fundamental political and social norms; and managing the 
rights and interests effectively and fairly to resolve and minimize conflicts.
The primary norm guiding the allocation function is efficiency.  Under the
neoliberal economic theory of property, the norm of efficiency promotes self-
interested decision-making and encourages maximization of individual 
welfare, with little if any consideration given to third party, public, or other 
external interests.64  The false equivalency of social welfare with individual 
welfare, in particular, has led the property system to ignore important public 
and noneconomic interests, especially in shared resources.65  Equating
individual self-interest with social welfare made sense when Adam Smith 
first developed his “invisible hand” theory of the market.66  As Smith 
explained, allowing individuals to pursue their self-interests promoted 
social welfare because each individual “endeavours to employ his capital 
as near home as he can, and consequently” to the benefit of the local 
economy.67  The individual “know[s] better the character and situation of
the persons whom he trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he 
knows better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress.”68 
Further, individuals pursuing their own self-interests would rationally 
choose the option yielding the greatest value to themselves and therefore
are “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
[their] intention.”69 
This reasoning, however, ignores current changes in the market and in
the natural and legal systems that have affected the conditions required 
for Smith’s invisible hand to work.70  Those changes include the rise of a 
global market that is now “only loosely tied to specific states.”71  The rise
is due in large part to the removal by nation-states of legal barriers to entry 
and the states’ recognition of the applicability of foreign laws.72  The
64. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 52, at 1258–59. 
65. See id.
 66. See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 178–81 (9th ed. 1799). 
67. Id. at 178. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 181. 
70. PISTOR, supra note 58, at 6.
 71. Id. at 7. 
72. Id.
84
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building blocks of capital, in other words, have now been “[d]islodg[ed] . . .
from the legal systems that begot them.”73 
Smith used the conditions of his time to develop his concept of the 
invisible hand.  Today we must do the same and update our understanding 
of how nature, property law, and the market interact.  In particular,
western-style societies must recognize that the operation of the invisible 
hand depends on the character and quality of the legal rules at play.74 
Once economic actors acquired the ability to choose their legal regime 
without moving assets, people, or legal entities, they became able to opt 
in or out of different regimes in varying business contexts, depending on 
their individual interests, without regard for a particular state’s social 
welfare.75  The failure to recognize the conditions required for Smith’s 
invisible hand to work well has led to serious problems of extremes.76 
Lacking appropriate considerations of scale, the efficiency norm drives
the behavior of property owners in a predatory direction, promoting a 
concentration of wealth and an unrelenting exploitation of natural resources 
at significant social and environmental costs.77  The assumptions underlying
the economic theory of property have not been checked regularly for 
accuracy, despite important changes in socio-ecological systems and in 
scientific understandings.
One example of property’s predatory predisposition can be found in 
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.78 In Fontainebleau
the owner of valuable oceanfront property planned to build in a way that 
intentionally blocked the sun from reaching the neighboring hotel’s pool 
area for much of the day.79 The owner of the neighboring hotel sought
to enjoin the construction, arguing that it would cast such a large shadow 
73. Id.
 74. Id. 
75. Id. at 7–8. 
76. See Lynda L. Butler, Property’s Problem with Extremes, 55 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 14–15, 17–20 (2020). 
77. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 52, at 1264 (discussing property’s 
problem of scale).  For an example of the unrelenting exploitation of natural resources, see 
Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 2109, 2110–11 (2005) (discussing Coca-Cola’s exploitation of groundwater in India 
to the point of causing water shortages); Gayatri Raghunandan, A Look at the Legal 
Issues Plachimada’s Struggle for Water Against Coca-Cola Has Brought Up, WIRE 
(Aug. 20, 2017), https://thewire.in/law/coca-cola-plachimada-kerala-water [https://perma.cc/ 
KH8M-UNGX].
78.  114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
79. Id. at 358. 
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that the beach and pool area would be unfit for its guests.80  The Florida
court rejected the claim, agreeing with other American jurisdictions 
that the English doctrine of ancient lights did not apply and therefore the 
complaining landowner could not acquire a right to the unobstructed flow 
of air and sunlight by implication or prescription.81  Yet if the same 
landowner owned both hotel properties, the landowner would have found 
a way to maximize use of the two properties—perhaps by sharing an expanded 
pool and spa facility—and might even have supported the enactment 
of a shadow ordinance to govern building construction along the valuable 
beachfront. Incorporating a stronger norm of cooperation into the obligation 
of neighboring landowners would have better mirrored the result that a 
single landowner would have achieved.  It also would have imposed 
a constraint on malicious and willful conduct taken to interfere with the 
beneficial use of neighboring property, especially with a landowner’s 
right to a reasonable expectation of gain.82  Malicious interference, in other
words, could have been curbed without recognizing a right to receive 
sunlight by prescription or by implication. 
Another example involves the construction of very tall condominium 
buildings along Central Park in New York City.83  These buildings have
or will produce shadows that extend for three-fourths of a mile and last 
for hours, significantly reducing temperatures and harming vegetation in 
the Park.84  The buildings are benefitting from an important public resource— 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 359–60; see  THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1020–21 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing the doctrine of ancient lights 
followed by English courts and uniformly rejected by American jurisdictions).  With 
its smaller land area, English courts were more concerned about the quality of life in urban 
areas, and taller buildings would mean less light. See Evan Nicole Brown, In England, 
the Right to Daylight Can Be a Legal Matter, ATLAS OBSCURA (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/right-to-light-law [https://perma.cc/8C4R-E6TW].
The United States, in contrast, was a much larger country, so common law property focused on 
promoting development.  See id. 
82. For cases recognizing a property owner’s nonpossessory right to a reasonable 
expectation of gain from the owner’s property, see Keeble v. Hickeringill (1707) 103 Eng. 
Rep. 1127, 1127–28; 11 East 573. 574–76; Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 
U.S. 215, 240 (1918). 
83. See Jenna McKnight, Wave of Super-Tall Towers in Manhattan Sparks Protests 
Over Shadows, DEZEEN (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.dezeen.com/2015/11/11/supertall-
skinny-skyscrapers-towers-manhattan-new-york-shop-architects-robert-stern-rafaely-
vinoly-jean-nouvel-portzamparc-controversy-protest/ [https://perma.cc/KU2S-3VG8].
84. See id.; Emily Nonko, The Super-Tall Towers Transforming NYC’s Skyline, 
N.Y. POST (Jan. 23, 2019, 7:44 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/01/23/the-super-tall-towers-
transforming-nycs-skyline/ [https://perma.cc/P9CE-K2BD]. The author and urban activist
Jane Jacobs described the shadows from the super tall towers as “a great eraser of human 
beings.” JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 106 (1961); see 
also Matthew Haag, How Luxury Developers Use a Loophole to Build Soaring Towers for 
86
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Central Park—without accounting for the interference with the public’s 
enjoyment of the Park or for the long-term harm to the Park’s ecosystems.85 
A twenty-degree drop in temperature on a cold windy day matters. The 
developers of these condominium projects benefit by the substantial 
increase in price they can charge for selling units that offer an unrestricted 
view of Central Park.  One buyer paid more than $238 million for a 24,000
square-foot unit, while two units in another skyscraper project sold for 
$100.5 and $91.5 million, respectively.86 One building, Central Park Tower, 
will be one of the tallest residential skyscrapers in the world, rising 1,550 
feet.87 By 2022, thirteen skyscrapers will tower over the south end of 
Central Park, creating a “striped” look when the sun shines on that area of 
the Park.88  Surely, common law courts could, in a public nuisance action,
force developers to consider serious adverse impacts when they are planning 
to exploit the value of a public resource in harmful ways. 
A predatory approach also can be seen in the practices of the owners of 
coal mines in Pennsylvania.89  Because Pennsylvania law recognized three 
separate estates in a tract of land—the surface, mineral, and support 
estates90—the owners of coal mines could sell just the surface estate, 
reserving the other two estates, and still have the power to mine to the 
point of the collapse of the surface estate.  An early legislative effort to 
protect surface estates from subsidence faced a successful constitutional 
challenge brought by the owner of a coal mine.91  In Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon, the United States Supreme Court recognized, for the 
the Ultrarich in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/
20/nyregion/tallest-buildings-manhattan-loophole.html [https://perma.cc/Z63A-VUQ9].
 85. Christopher Tramutola, New York: A Dark Cloud Over City Parks, TOPOS (Sept. 5, 
2014), https://www.toposmagazine.com/new-york-dark-cloud-city-parks/ [https://perma.cc/
Q8H8-JWAJ]. 
86. See Nonko, supra note 84.  Sales of the high-priced luxury units have slowed
considerably.  See Derek Thompson, Why Manhattan’s Skyscrapers Are Empty, ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/american-housing-has- 
gone-insane/605005/ [https://perma.cc/SGU4-HFCE].
87. Amy Dobson, Tallest Residential Building in the World Reveals New Details–
Including 100th-Floor Amenity Level Overlooking New York City, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2020, 
12:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/amydobson/2020/01/24/tallest-residential- buildi
ng-in-the-world-reveals-new-detailsincluding-100th-floor-amenity-level-overlooking-new-
york-city/#87e919d299c1 [https://perma.cc/S5PC-NNRY].
88. Nonko, supra note 84; McKnight, supra note 83. 
89. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 563–65 (1984). 
90.  Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227, 234–35 (Pa. 1943). 
91. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). 
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first time, that a regulation could go too far, creating a situation functionally 
equivalent to physical confiscation.92  In Mahon, the Court concluded that
a law causing the loss of all commercially practicable use of the remaining 
mineral estate presented such a situation.93  Years later, the Court finally 
stopped this harmful mining practice when a coal company challenged a 
similar statute.94  In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 
the Court upheld the law without directly reversing Mahon.95  The Court
reasoned that the coal left in place only represented 2% of the coal as a 
whole and that the support estate really had no meaning or value other 
than in relation to the surface or mineral estate.96 
In some jurisdictions that recognize only two estates—the mineral and 
the surface estates—a presumption of dominance instead is made in favor 
of the holder of the mineral estate when that interest has been severed from 
the surface estate.97  The holder of the mineral estate, in effect, is viewed as 
having an implied easement of surface use.98  This presumption of dominance
serves the same purpose as the three-estate system, imposing much of the 
risk of loss or damage on the owner of the surface estate.  Though both 
practices shape the expectations of the mineral estate holders, ordinary 
buyers of surface estates might not foresee or expect that their surface 
estate could face subsidence or limitations of such magnitude that they 
could not effectively use the land. If the goal is to allow mining that eventually 
could damage or significantly restrict the surface estate, then surely a more 
transparent and equitable approach exists.  Couldn’t, for example, the company 
lease, instead of sell, the surface estate under terms that would end the lease 
after a set period of time chosen because it reflects when the coal company’s 
experts predict the surface estate is expected to collapse or otherwise 
suffer serious limitations? This approach would shape the reasonable 
expectations of the holders of the mineral and the surface estates in a more 
transparent and fair way. 
92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 412–13, 416. 
94. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987). 
95. Id. 
96. See id. at 498, 500–01.  The Court defined the denominator for measuring economic 
loss to be the property as a whole, refusing to interpret Mahon as requiring the Court to 
focus on each pillar of coal.  Id. at 497–98. 
97. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971); Prop. Owners of
Leisure Land, Inc. v. Woolf & Magee, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
98. See Jones v. Getty Oil Co., 458 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), aff’d, 
470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).  See generally JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL (6th ed. 2014) (stating that if the mineral estate is severed from the surface 
estate, the surface owner’s rights are subject to the mineral owner’s usage of the surface 
to reasonably produce minerals). 
88
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The distribution and management functions of property can provide
checks on the destructive tendencies of the neoliberal efficiency norm. 
Traits critical to a resilient property system—one that promotes system 
integrity—include: the capacity to interact with ecological and other systems 
to monitor feedbacks and identify problems; the ability to adapt through 
self-organization and self-regulation; and the power to respond by absorbing 
change and persisting, without becoming unstable.99  To nurture these traits, 
the property system must recognize the need for flexibility, inclusiveness, 
and innovation, as well as a diversity of property arrangements and a 
redundancy of functions.100 To date, however, the American property system
primarily focuses on promoting the efficient allocation of interests to private 
parties.101  This approach made sense when the property system first 
developed in America; land and water resources were abundant, wildlife 
filled the airs, lands, and waters, and the settlers’ primary goal was survival.102 
Times have changed, however, with the limits of natural resources now
understood and the costs of unconstrained land development well
documented.103  Despite new physical realities and scientific understandings, 
business continues as usual, assuming away real costs in the name of 
efficiency and individual property rights. 
The management function of property, in particular, can help to ensure 
that the property system is resilient enough to handle change, whether 
gradual or sudden, foreseeable or unexpected.104  Because the property 
regime links ecological and social systems in ways that can have longstanding 
impacts, the approach of property to managing rights and interests is critical 
to the integrity of socio-ecological systems.  Dealing with problems of 
extremes will require significant reforms, so it would be easy to doubt the 
role that the property system could play in helping to solve the problems.  
After all, common law property is set up to handle incremental change,105 
not the type of comprehensive or sudden change that might be needed to 
combat extreme problems.  Yet if changes in internal norms and assumptions
of common law property are made, those reforms will guide all individual
property owners to make more sustainable management decisions and 
99. See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 49, at 894–95. 
100.  Id. 
101.  See id. at 879. 
102.  See id. at 906. 
103.  Id. at 907–08. 
104.  Id. at 891–92 (discussing resilience in the context of ecosystems). 
105.  See id. at 900–03. 
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would have, in the aggregate, a much greater impact. Further, without
changes to the norms and operating principles of property, externally 
imposed reforms would meet resistance and pushback, and the reasonable 
expectations of property owners would not shift in a more sustainable 
direction. Historically, property has adapted in part through its tolerance 
for informal customs and practices, which have made the system more 
inclusive and allowed experimentation to occur, at the fringe, without formal 
recognition.106  These experiments have provided important information
about pressure points in the formal system and readied the system for more 
significant reform.107 
Once reasonable expectations of property owners are reshaped through 
the management function to consider external interests affected by a property 
owner’s choices, the distribution function then can act more effectively as
a safety valve to ensure fairness on an individual basis while also avoiding 
moral outrage and instability on a system-wide basis.  Such outrage and 
instability are likely to result when the integrity of political, social, and
biophysical systems is seriously threatened by out-of-date rules and principles.
One example of the distribution function working to avoid system instability 
occurred in landlord/tenant law in the twentieth century.  Legal principles 
governing residential leases had not kept up with changes in building
construction and mechanical systems, nor with the plight of urban tenants 
who no longer used their home to make a living or raise food for survival.108 
Yet, until the 1970s, residential tenants still assumed the risk of living 
in uninhabitable premises.109  The courts typically explained that tenants
had the duty to inspect the premises for suitability and, as possessors, 
assumed the risk of defects arising later in the lease.110  Some exceptions
were made when the defects caused substantial interference with use and 
enjoyment and the tenant could not reasonably be expected to notice the 
defects in a timely manner.111  Under those exceptions, though, the tenant’s 
remedy was to vacate the premises.112  To make matters worse, tenants
106. See id. at 901. 
107. Id. at 898–99. 
108. See SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 476–77. 
109.  See id. 
 110. See Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897; Aleyn 27, 27.  See generally
Richard H. Chused, Saunders (a.k.a. Javins) v. First National Realty Corporation,
in PROPERTY STORIES 123, 127–35 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009) 
(discussing landlord/tenant law prior to reform). 
111. See Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 163 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Mass. 1959). 
112. See id. (discussing when a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment could 
constitute a constructive eviction).  Compare Sutton v. Temple (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1108, 
1109; 12 M. & W. 52, 55 (following caveat lessee, which imposes the risk of defects in 
the condition of the premises on the tenant unless the parties otherwise agree), with Smith 
90
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who signed a lease with a covenant to repair basically became insurers of 
the premises.113 
These tensions came to a boil in federal court in the District of Columbia
when the court considered whether to continue to follow the traditional
caveat lessee approach to residential leases for tenants living in urban 
slums.114  In Javins v. First National Realty Corporation, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered the 
unsanitary conditions facing urban tenants living in housing with over 1,000 
code violations.115  Reasoning that the traditional approach promoted neither 
the reasonable expectations of urban tenants nor the policies of modern 
housing codes, the court concluded that a residential lease in the District 
imposed an implied warranty of habitability on the landlord.116  This implied 
warranty obligated the landlord to maintain the premises in habitable condition 
throughout the lease.117  The court further explained that most urban tenants
no longer had the ability or the means to repair defective conditions in 
modern residential complexes.118  Complicated mechanical systems shared 
by an entire building and the development of specialized expertise dealing 
with those systems made repairs by the tenants unlikely and impracticable.119 
Without the action of this court, squalid living conditions in the District 
were likely to lead to further social unrest.120  Eventually legislatures followed
the example of the judiciary and adopted versions of the Uniform 
Residential Landlord/Tenant Act.121 
v. Marrable (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 693, 694; 11 M. & W. 6, 7–9 (creating an exception for a
short-term furnished lease). 
113. Even if the residence were destroyed, the tenant would still owe the rent because the
traditional common law courts used the independent covenant model.  SINGER, PROPERTY, 
supra note 21, at 477–78. 
114. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
115. Id. at 1073; see Chused, supra note 110, at 123, 127–35 (providing background on
the Javins dispute). 
116.  Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072–74. 
117. Id. at 1082. 
118. Id. at 1078–79. 
119.  Id. at 1074, 1077–79. 
120. See Chused, supra note 110, at 135 (discussing the social unrest in Washington,
D.C. around the time of the litigation). 
121. See Christopher Wm. Sullivan, Note, Forgotten Lessons from the Common Law,
the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, and the Holdover Tenant, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1287, 1311–12 (2006).  In 2015, the Uniform Law Commission approved a revised 
version.  See REVISED UNIF. RESIDENT LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2015). 
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A second example of the distribution function in operation involves the 
use of common law notions of equity and fairness to promote equal access 
to basic public services. Those principles include theories treating some 
services provided by private parties as “governmental in nature” because 
of the significance of the services to the public in general.122  The services 
could concern an essential government function, become essential because of 
a special privilege conferred by government on a private party—for example, 
the power of eminent domain—or involve a type of monopoly power due 
to the nature of the service.123  The “public” nature of the activity being
conducted by the private party, in other words, had provided “unique 
privileges and liberties” to the private party that became the source of a 
duty to serve the public equally.124  Over hundreds of years, English and
American courts have used common law concepts like “property clothed 
with a public interest” to address serious problems arising from the provision 
of government-type services by private companies.125  The courts applied 
the concepts, in various forms, to rates charged for essential goods like grain, 
access to facilities such as inns and mills, modes of transportation such as 
toll roads and railroads, and the provision of basics needed for survival 
like drinking water.126 
Property’s operating principles also provide ways to check problems 
caused by property transactions and uses.  The numerus clausus concept 
limits the choice of property forms available to parties, working in the 
shadows to control options and thus reduce information costs.127  Another
principle, ratione soli, gives landowners the first option to capture wild 
animals or use other natural resources on their land.128  Yet another, the
seemingly obscure ad coelum doctrine, gives the right to use the subsurface 
and the air space above a tract to the landowner.129  For a long time, the
doctrine described landowners’ rights in absolute terms, declaring their 
rights as extending up to the heavens and down to the depths of the Earth.130 
More recently, as technological advances have made new uses of the air 
and underground possible, courts have reexamined the doctrine’s definition
122. See CHARLES M.HAAR &DANIEL WM.FESSLER,THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS:A
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 146–48, 200–08 (1986). 
123. See id. at 145–51, 199–221 (discussing when property became “clothed with
a public interest”). 
124. Id. at 201. 
125. Id. at 120–21, 145–48, 200–03, 206, 224–25. 
126.  Id. at 145–48, 200–07. 
127. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
128. See Goodard v. Winchell, 52 N.W. 1124, 1124–25 (Iowa 1892). 
129. See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936). 
130. See id.; Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929). 
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of landowners’ rights.131  The invention of the airplane, for instance, led 
to the recognition that flight might not occur at all under the absolutist 
view if the consent of every landowner involved in a flight route were 
required.132  The landowners’ air rights under the ad coelum doctrine thus
were redefined in more practical terms to involve the right to the airspace 
that is connected to the enjoyment of the land, which at least includes the 
airspace that the landowner is occupying and using.133  Some courts have 
similarly reexamined the doctrine for subsurface rights.134  New subsurface
uses like hydraulic fracking and Elon Musk’s tunnel project in Los Angeles 
may further test the limits of the doctrine’s applicability to subsurface rights.135 
Other operating principles help to resolve disputes, often with remarkable
clarity and simplicity.  Nemo dat, or the good title rule, promotes the in 
rem character of property rights, allowing owners or possessors to inject 
their property into the stream of commerce without losing their rights by 
limiting the interests of subsequent transferees to the rights of their
transferor.136  Under the common law good title rule, a seller or transferor 
generally cannot transfer a greater interest than he or she has.137  Another
concept, relativity of title, often works in concert with the good title rule 
to provide a simple but powerful dispute resolution principle that protects 
the interests of the prior peaceful possessor of tangible property against a 
subsequent possessor, even if the prior possessor is not the true owner.138 
The interests of the finder, for example, prevail over the interests of
the subsequent possessor who is not the true owner or who does not claim 
131. See Hinman, 84 F.2d at 757. 
132. See id. at 758. 
133. Id. at 757–58. 
134. Compare Edwards, 24 S.W.2d at 620–21 (majority opinion), with id. at 621–22
(Logan, J., dissenting).
135. See Alana Semuels, When Elon Musk Tunnels Under Your Home, ATLANTIC 
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/11/los-angeles-
elon-musk-tunnels-under-neighborhood/575725/ [https://perma.cc/3RM7-EQEH]; see also
CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT & DANIEL NYBERG, CLIMATE CHANGE, CAPITALISM, AND 
CORPORATIONS 32 (2015) (describing fracking as an example of corporate “blindness” to 
ecological disaster).  For an example of the conflict created when fracking became viable 
and homeowners did not own the mineral rights below their surface estate, see John Murawski, 
Lack of Mineral Rights Puts Some Homebuyers in Legal Limbo, WINSTON-SALEM J. 
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://journalnow.com/news/state/lack-of-mineral-rights-puts-some-
homebuyers-in-legal-limbo/article_64a17c86-2d9a-11e2-8f9b-0019bb30f31a.html [https://
perma.cc/LV9F-NEUV]. 
136. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 81, at 882–83. 
137. See id.
 138. See SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 825.
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through the true owner. Further, the subsequent possessor may not divert 
attention away from his inferior claim by challenging the title of the prior 
possessor.139  This concept takes a relational approach to defining property
rights, varying the result depending on the parties to the dispute and 
promoting the importance of possession in the property system. 
Even disputes involving interests in shared or unowned resources can
be governed by the relativity of title concept.  Under the common law riparian 
doctrine traditionally applicable in the water-rich East, shorefront landowners 
have correlative rights in the adjacent waterway, entitling them to make 
reasonable use of the waters subject to the same rights in other riparian 
landowners.140  Upstream riparians thus have the first opportunity to conduct 
a reasonable but not unlimited use.141  When the resources involve intangible
intellectual property, the rights of a creator who cannot fully protect her 
creation because of the nature of her business or activity may still receive 
some protection against commercial exploitation by competitor third parties, 
but not generally against the public.142  In International News Service v.
Associated Press, the Court stressed that the key perspective in resolving 
the dispute before it was not the rights of the claimant as against the public, 
but rather the rights of the claimant as against the defendant, a competitor 
in the business of gathering the news.143 
Anti-fragmentation devices are also built into property’s operating rules 
to help prevent excessive segmentation.144  Over hundreds of years, English
and American property regimes have developed tools to deal with physical 
and conceptual fragmentation.  The Statute Quia Emptores, for example, 
was adopted to stop subinfeudation of feudal estates in land, while intestate 
succession laws clarified the passage of property upon the death of the 
owner.145 The common law estates of dower and curtesy and their statutory 
replacements, the forced share provisions, save a portion of a decedent’s 
estate for the surviving spouse.146  Enclosure laws balance the relationship
139. See Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664; 1 Strange 505, 505;
Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636, 637 (Minn. 1892). 
140. See Robert H. Abrams, Riparian Right, BRITANNICA (Sept. 6, 2007), https://
www.britannica.com/topic/riparian-right [https://perma.cc/498B-X7LK]. 
141. Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction:
Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95, 
171 (1985).
142. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 216 (1918). 
143. Id. at 239 (“The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the 
complainant as against the public, instead of considering the rights of complainant and 
defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves.”). 
144. Heller, supra note 25, at 1169. 
145. See id. at 1171. 
146. See id. at 1170–71; JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 400 (3d
ed. 1993). 
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of landowners in rural areas with members of the community engaged in
activities like hunting and grazing that could benefit from open lands.147 
The laws, for example, indicate whether land enclosure is based on a fencing-
in or fencing-out default rule.148  Boundary related legal principles also
define the appropriate scale of boundedness in various contexts ranging 
from minimum lot sizes for residential development to real estate taxation 
of individual tracts and application of the unitary tract concept as a way 
to gauge community understandings about tract ownership in various legal 
contexts.149  Other rules, like the Rule against Perpetuities and the policy 
against dead hand control, deal with temporal fragmentation,150 while 
organizations recognized under common interest community laws address 
problems of social fragmentation by linking lot owners having shared 
property interests.151 
Property’s structure and operating principles thus provide ways to check
some of the problems caused by property transactions and use. These
checks, however, will not be enough—without change—to deal with
property’s problem of extremes.  The type of constraints needed will depend
on the reasons for the property system’s failure to control the development
of extremes.
147. The concept of common lands, for example, protected the public’s interests in 
hunting, fishing, and fowling in some of the original colonies.  See, e.g., LYNDA LEE BUTLER & 
MARGIT LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW 162–88 (1988) (discussing the 
development of the commons concept in England, colonial Virginia, and the Commonwealth of 
Virginia).  Some courts also protected customs that allowed hunters to follow game onto 
unenclosed rural lands.  See, e.g., Baker v. Howard Cnty. Hunt, 188 A. 223, 227–28 (Md. 
1936) (discussing the relative rights of landowners and fox hunters); M’Conico v. 
Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 246 (1818) (discussing the right to hunt on unenclosed 
land).
148. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 81, at 370–73. 
149. See Heller, supra note 25, at 1173.  The unitary tract concept, for example, is
important in deciding the extent to which the doctrine of constructive adverse possession 
applies to lands under common ownership when a portion is occupied by an adverse possessor.  
See 9 MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68.01–.02 (2020); see also
SPRANKLING, supra note 45, at 455, 460–61.  The concept is also important to defining 
riparian land. Butler, supra note 141, at 122–23. 
150. See Heller, supra note 25, at 1178–81. 
151. See David C. Drewes, Note, Putting the “Community” Back in Common Interest
Communities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 314, 315–16 (2001). 
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IV. REORDERING FOR SYSTEM INTEGRITY
Dealing with property’s problem of extremes will require fundamental 
reforms to property’s norm-based assumptions and incentive structure.  
Each problem of extremes has its own causal connection with the property 
system that will shape the nature of change.  All three are fueled by the 
freeriding incentives of the economic theory of property rights controlling 
western-style property systems.  When the problem involves the type of 
catastrophic environmental harm that could result from climate change, 
the freeriding is global in nature and, in the view of the 2018 Nobel Prize 
winning economist William Nordhaus, the “fundamental reason for the
lack of progress” in combatting climate change.152  To compound the problem, 
“the potential impacts of extreme events—what are known as ‘tail events’ . . . 
[may be] so surprising, so outside everyday observations, that we are 
unprepared to deal with them.”153  That is, the tail events “come from the 
far tail, or most unlikely part, of a probability distribution.”154  Solving extreme
problems that undermine the stability of political, social, and biophysical 
systems requires a reexamination and reframing of the norms and principles 
of the institution of property—one of our core ordering and management 
systems.155 
One important reordering must involve strengthening norms of cooperation 
to overcome or constrain predatory instincts encouraged by the neoliberal
economic theory of property.  The destructiveness furthered by malicious 
or bad faith use of property should not be part of the rights of property
owners. No one should have the right to seriously harm or endanger 
the well-being of the whole or the integrity of common or shared systems. 
One way to restrain destructive tendencies is to stop equating net individual 
welfare with net social welfare.  This step is especially necessary when the
integrity of the whole is harmed by the use of a part—such as by promoting 
coal mining when less harmful energy sources exist—or when the property 
owner is freeriding off shared or common resources without accounting for 
substantial costs to those resources—e.g., the Central Park skyscrapers.
152. William D. Nordhaus, A New Solution: The Climate Club, N.Y. REV. (June 4, 
2015), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/06/04/new-solution-climate-club/ [https://perma.cc/
5LDZ-826N] (reviewing GERNOT WAGNER & MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, CLIMATE SHOCK: 
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A HOTTER PLANET (2015)). 
153. Id.
 154. Id.
155. Several scholars describe the reframing of moral values of governance systems as a
necessity and recognize climate change not only as a physical threat, but also as a threat to “the
legitimacy and stability of governance systems and actors.”  Katrina Brown, W. Neil 
Adger & Joshua E. Cinner, Moving Climate Change Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons, 
54 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 61, 61 (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/ 
pii/S0959378018313116?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/999B-QHLU]. 
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Because of changes in the legal, economic, and natural systems, it is important 
to recognize that the conditions necessary for effective operation of Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand have been undermined.156  Thus, in determining
whether a property owner’s proposed use promotes net social welfare, the 
decision-making process now should include meaningful consideration of 
third party and public interests. Becoming more outward-regarding when
common or shared resources are involved would, in turn, lead to stronger 
norms of cooperation. 
Another way to strengthen norms of cooperation is to eliminate 
presumptions or preferences in favor of one private property owner when 
shared or common resources are involved and other property interests in 
the same or connected resources could be damaged or destroyed.  For example, 
although a legal presumption or rule may have shaped the expectations of 
the favored coal mine owner in Mahon and other similar cases, the owners 
of affected surface estates would not necessarily foresee use of the mines 
to the point of destroying the surface estate,157 especially not when the
original sale of the surface land occurred long before technological advances 
allowed more extensive mining.  Instead, the law should encourage the 
traditionally preferred property owner to pursue alternative arrangements 
that would accommodate both users or at least minimize harm and loss of 
investment.  A less permanent property interest in the surface land—for 
example, a lease for a fixed term with the term set by the party with the 
superior information about plans for future mining—would discourage 
significant and potentially wasted investment in the surface estate. 
The Central Park building projects exemplify all too clearly how social 
utility can differ from individual utility.158  To the developer, the project 
is all about profiting from sales—about selling as many luxury condominium 
units as allowed under sound engineering principles and under the law.  
An unrestricted view of Central Park significantly increases the price of a 
luxury unit, especially when the unit is on one of the top floors.159  To the 
public, however, the project is not about providing expensive housing for 
the ultra rich but rather about harming a treasured public resource that is 
156. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text (discussing some of those changed
conditions). 
157. See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
159. See Caroline Biggs, Rooms with a View (and How Much You’ll Pay for Them), N.Y. 
TIMES (May 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/realestate/rooms-with-
a-view-and-how-much-youll-pay-for-them.html [https://perma.cc/39LN-XGXV]. 
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important to the well-being of millions of people and that is a substantial 
draw for tourism and other economic activities.160  Thus, when evaluating 
the utility of public and private interests, the comparison should not simply 
weigh the considerable revenues generated by sales of the condominiums 
with the difficult-to-measure value of the park to the public.  Rather it 
should also consider the benefits to end users—the buyers of the units versus 
the millions of people who would be burdened by significant harm to the 
Park. 
A second important reform must address property’s problem of scale—
that is, the limited perspectives taken by property owners in making decisions 
about their property.  Part of the problem is the quantitative methodologies 
used to evaluate individual and social welfare.  Besides assuming that 
preferences and values can be measured quantitatively and that good data 
can be found, these tools underestimate or overlook interests not easily 
measured in economic terms.  As Laurence Tribe explained years ago: 
“[Q]uantitative decision-making techniques . . . reduce[] entire problems 
to terms that misstate their underlying structure, typically collapsing into 
the task of maximizing some simple quantity an enterprise whose ordering 
principle is not one of maximization at all.”161  Doug Kysar critiques the
main quantitative tool, cost-benefit analysis, in evaluating climate change 
policymaking and concludes that it is “an unacceptably crude device for 
guiding policy choices in the context of a massively complex and morally 
imbued problem such as global climate change.”162  Consider, by way of
comparison, the decision-making process used by numerous climate scientists 
in preparing the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. A much more complex process, it includes evaluating relevant 
scientific studies, formulating possible conclusions, running multiple modeling 
scenarios to test those conclusions, and then using a consensus approach 
not only in making decisions but also in assessing the wording of the 
conclusions and the level of confidence to be attached to the conclusions.163 
Although it would be unreasonable to expect ordinary property owners to
160. See McKnight, supra note 83. 
161. Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 
66, 97 (1972). 
162. Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 555, 558 (2004). 
163. See, e.g., Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC 
Starts Meeting to Finalize Working Group II Report (Mar. 25, 2014), https://archive. 
ipcc.ch/pdf/press/140325_WGII_press_release.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG9N-3KJ4] (discussing 
the process used); LISA V. ALEXANDER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/
2018/02/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR8B-8Q83] (discussing the models 
and evidence, with quantitative and qualitative assessments). 
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follow such a process, a reframing of underlying property norms and
principles would guide property owners to include stronger norms of 
cooperation and to recognize outward-regarding interests. 
Another reform would expand the reach of the norm of preservation 
used in managing certain property arrangements involving interests divided 
over time to situations involving conflicting interests in shared resources 
or common systems.  In the area of landlord/tenant law, for example, the 
doctrine of waste prevents a tenant from harming the long-term interests 
of the landlord.164  Under the doctrine the tenant is obligated to return the
premises to the landlord basically in the same condition, reasonable wear 
and tear excepted.165  Life estate holders similarly owe a duty not to 
commit waste to the future interest holder, and even improvements to the 
estate causing a substantial change could result in liability.166  Surely a duty 
to preserve critical biophysical resources and ecosystem services to the 
degree needed to sustain life and protect the integrity of the whole for present 
and future generations would make as much sense.  If traditional property 
law could realize the importance of protecting property rights from too 
much fragmentation, then a modern property system should be able to 
draw upon its evolutionary tools to address problems of excess threatening 
the integrity of the Earth system as well as the social and ecological systems 
dependent on it. 
V. CONCLUSION
The structure and operating principles of property are subtle—so subtle 
that property is often viewed primarily as a way to allocate interests in
resources and promote efficiency through marketplace transactions.  Yet 
property also performs important distribution and management functions 
that address relational interests not only among private parties but also
between property owners and their government.  Property, in other words,
plays an important role in defining the power relationship between individual 
property owners and their government, as well as between property owners 
and members of society.  The paradox of property is that it is both a 
fundamental individual right and a fundamental part of our social systems, 
164. See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 658 (2006). 
165. See Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6, 14–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929). 
166. See id.; Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738, 741 (Wis. 1899); see also
Purdy, supra note 164, at 658. 
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broadly defined. It is time to resolve that paradox by recognizing property’s 
dependence on the Earth system as well as property’s role in defining our 
relationship with economic and political systems.  The key to taking this
step is to view property as a system with a complex infrastructure and
embedded norms and operating principles that fail to reflect current
biophysical and social conditions.
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